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The view is widespread that the rate of accumulation of capital in
recent years in the United States has been too low. This conclusion is based
in part upon a comparison of the rate of net investment, especially of business
fixed investment, relative to aggregate output both with its past value in the
U.S. and with its value in the other advanced industrial countries. it is based
as well upon symptoms that are presumptively traceable to a slow—down in capital
formation, most especially the apparent cessation in the growth of labor
productivity.
A deterioration in the rate of return to savers resulting from the
interaction of inflation with an unindexed tax system is often cited among the
reasons for this shift in performance of the U.S. economy. In particular, the
failure of the tax rules to permit correct accounting for depreciation and capi-
tal gains, together with a not obviously explicable reluctance of businesses to
use the LIFO inventory procedures permitted under the tax law, result in a bur-
den of tax on the return from investment that increases with the rate of
inflation. Furthermore, because the tax treatment of nominally deinoninated
assets also ignores inflation, considerable if poorly understood stress is
placed upon the financial structure of the economy in a period of rapid increase
in the price level.—2—
Aconsequence of this view, that there is a problem, and that taxes
have something to do with it, has been a movement to increase the incentive
to save and invest by changing the rules. Somewhat oddly, thereseems to
be relatively little interest in approaching this by asking whatsteps would
be necessary to correct for inflation. Nor has there yet appearedan ex-
plicit strater of shifting taxation away from an income and towards a
consumption base, a policy not necessarily related to inflation. Perhaps
because of the perceived complexity of the former and unfamiliarity with
the latter, policy—makers and the interest groups actively involved with
the issue have been attracted to ad hoc measures.
Most prominent and widely discussed among these have been proposals
to allow taxpayers to write off the cost of acquisition of productiveassets,
for purposes of calculating income subject to tax, more rapidly than the
economic definition of income would imply. Bills sponsored by HouseWays
andMeans Conmrittee members Conable and Jones (the "10—5—3 proposal"), by Com-
mittee chairman Al Ullman, and by the Senate Finance Committee (the "2—)4—7—l0
proposal")would invarious ways provide for a grouping of assets into
categories,for which relatively rapid write of f for tax purposes would be
allowed. Other changes in tax rules recently enacted or currently discussed
with a similar objective of reducing the tax on capital income frompresent
inflation—influenced levels are lower effective rates on long—term capital
gains, exemption of a limited amount of dividends and savings account interest
from individual income taxation, and relaxation of restrictions on tax deferred
saving of the sort now allowed via employer sponsored pension programs,
Individual Retirement Accounts and Keogh Plans.—3--
Thesephenomena and policy choices raise issues of economic
analysis, both theoretical and empirical, which have attracted an appro-
priate amount of professional attention.Perhaps the most important are
whether the facts indeed warrant the conclusion that there should bemore
capital formation and whether, if so, rule changes of the sort under con-
sicleration are likely to call it forth. This paper dodges those difficult
questions. It considers rather the problem of designing tax and related
rules to promote capital formation.1
To put the matter somewhat more precisely, I take up in thispaper
the characteristics of and interactions among measures to effect saving
and investment incentives (henceforth "S—Iincentives")in the context of
an income tax system that is inadequately indexed for inflation. Although
the issues have been separately addressed many times, a treatment that is at
once unified and reasonably simple is lacking.2 Furthermore, existing analyses
that may incorporate more realistic detail have failed to appreciate suf-
ficiently what legal commentators call the "pressures" introduced to the tax
system by inflation and by the present ad hoc measures to deal with it.
These pressures are by and large created by the opportunity to makemoney
by undertaking transactions which have offsetting effects on the balance sheet,
but different tax consequences, a process I have referred to as "tax
arbitrage." It is these opportunities for arbitrage profit and how thesys—
1 I have addressed theselarger issues in Bradford [1980]. Readers may also
find helpful the discussion there of the problems created by inconsistent
treatment of different forms o± savings. For further discussion of the general
issues see King [1980]. For empirical analysis of the U.S. experiencesee, for
example, Boskin [19181, Eisner [1971], Feldstein [1977a,b; 1980], Nalkiel [1979].
2 For an examination of selected investmentincentive proposals under con-
sideration recently in the United States see Hendershott and Eu [1980]._l4
tam eliminates them that I shall stress in the following pages.
Underlying the analysis in this paper is the view that rules which
do not work well in a simple model world will also not work well in the
complex real world. This is the justification for confining attention almost
wholly to situations of no uncertainty, no borrowing and lending constraints,
and uncomplicated financial relationships. There is no doubt that the extreme
sorts of outcomes that emerge in simple models, such as conclusions that a
taxpayer's wealth will consist all of one asset, or involve large borrowing,
will be often be prevented in actuality by information and other uncertainty—
related costs. It is clear that a proper treatment of uncertainty isnecessary
to a full understanding of capital market equilibrium. However, arbitrageamong
relatively risk—free assets represents a significant subset of the transactions
that must be dealt with by the tax system. The qualitative character of out-
comes predicted by the certainty models is observed in the real world.
Furthermore, the learning process is obviously still incomplete and cheap high—
speed information handling is increasingly extending sophisticated tax arbitrage
to a wider market. Thus problems now manifested in the "aggressive" behavior of
a few taxpayers are quite likely to be seen more generally in the future.
In Section I below, I sketch out the criteria applicable to choice
among saving and investment incentives and offer a classification of measures
differing according to the transactions to which they apply and the way they
work. Section II looks at the major elements of this structure in the context
of stable prices, while Section III takes up the difficult problems posed by
inflation. There is a brief summing up in Section IV.—5—
I.BACKGROUND ON SAVING ANDIIWESTMENTINCENTIVES
Some preliminaries: First, as to what I mean by saving and
investment. I shall use the terms more or less interchangeably, but to
the extent there is a distinction, investment refers to the acquisition
of a real asset, while saving refers to the foregoing of consumption.
Second, as to what I mean by saving and investment incentives. The background
for this discussion is an income tax system. An income tax, by definition,
embodies a saving or investment disincentive in that it creates a divergence
between the rate of return on investment and the yield to the saver. Inflation
may increase this tax wedge.Thus the incentives we are considering are rela-
tive to existing disincentives, whatever their merits.
It is important to be aware of a resulting ambiguity of the term
saving or investment incentive as applied to the measures studied here.
As I have stressed elsewhere [19801 ,inview of the government's budget
constraint an incentive such as the investment tax credit may be bought at the
price of higher tax rates than would otherwise be possible. The net effect may
be an increase in the tax wedge applicable, at least for some savers.
Criteria for Choice Among S—I Incentives
At the risk of banality, I would suggest that the criteria for choice
among S—I incentive measures can be summarized by the familiar trinity of
equity, efficiency and simplicity.
Equity. As usual, equity is the most difficult criterion to deal
with. To start with, one of the objectives of currently considered S—I measures
is to offset inequities that have been perpetrated by inflation, and thus con-
centration on the static characteristics of rules may miss part of the point.—6—
This is a particular aspect of the more general problem of distinguishing between
transition and steady—state effects.It is regretable that I shall have most to
say about the better—understood steady state properties of S—Iincentives.
As we shall see, there are essentially two sorts of available S—I
incentives. The first ——whichI call C—tax measures ——tendto
equalize the rate of return received by savers at all levels of economic
well—being. The second ——whichI call direct grant measures ——tendto raise
all rates of return received by savers, relative to the social rate of return,
but do not alter the differentials among after—tax rates of return on savings
characteristic of a graduated income tax. Even with a fixed structure of
tax rates the difference in relative individual welfare involved is not a
priori certain, as it has to do with the lifetime pattern of earnings and
consumption, but it is plausible that the former class of incentives (basically
deductions from the income tax base) is relatively more favorable to high
bracket taxpayers than the latter (basically investment grants or credits). If
desired, such differences could be offset by adjustments in marginal tax rates.
This would leave horizontal equity differences between the two
approaches, and these are essentially the same as those involved in choosing
between a consumption base and and an income base for taxation. Relative to a
consumption tax an income tax penalizes those who postpone consumption, whether
because they simply prefer to do so, or because their labor earnings, gifts,
transfers, etc., occur early in life.1
1 For further discussion of this issue see Bradford and Toder 11916].—1—
Efficiency.As Auerbach [1979b1 has emphasized, we are dealing here
with a problem in the economics of the second best. This means that, for
example, a measure creating a divergence in the real rates of return on
investment in machines of different durability may not be inferior to a measure,
similar in most other respects, that causes these rates to be equalized. Our
analysis of S—I incentives will simply point out the distortions they engender.
There are three margins of trade—off of particular interest. First
is that between present and future consumption. An income tax introduces a
wedge between the trade—off available to individuals, through borrowing and
lending or through real investment and production, and that available socially
via the production process——the social rate of return on investment. It thus
inherently involves an inefficiency, albeit a potentially second best one, since
revenue mast be raised somehow. When an income tax is assessed at different
rates on different individuals, there is also a violation of exchange ef-
ficiency: different individuals have different marginal rates of substitution
of present for future consumption. As has been mentioned, S—I incentives of the
C—tax type ameliorate both sorts of wedges, while direct grant measures simply
shift the distribution of private rates of return, after taxes, upward relative
to the social rate of return.
The second margin is between investment in different forms or dif-
ferent sectors. This is a matter of production efficiency. If the real social
rate of return is not the same in two activities, an opportunity exists to
increase consumption in all periods by shifting resources from the low yield—8—
tothe high yield activity. Such a situation commonly arises under an income
tax with the weaknesses typical of actual tax accounting systems. Individuals
have an incentive, for example, to push investment in owner occupied housing to
the point that the marginal social (and private) return equals the after—tax
return in fully taxed industries. Similar inefficiencies are predicted by
theory when S—I incentives are limited to particular classes of assets, for
example, manufacturing equipment, or to particular industries. A particular
case is the difference in social rate of return to capital of different durabi—
lities that is predicted when an investment credit is not appropriately varied
with the service life of the asset. At a more refined level of analysis, simi-
lar comments would apply to the risk characteristics of real investments.
A third significant margin, between different assets in the
household's portfolio, also involves questions of risk bearing. Efficient allo-
cation of risk will normally imply a certain division of each individual's
portfolio among real asset types and among financial instruments such as bonds
and shares. Equilibrium portfolios with taxes may be expected to diverge from
efficiency, and S—I incentives often worsen the distortions characteristic of
the existing income tax, typically in the direction of increasing debt—equity
ratios in the aggregate and concentrating debt ownership relatively in low tax
bracket hands (including life insurance and pension fund portfolios).-
The degree to which the S—I incentive displaces the existing income
tax presents a further aspect of efficiency. It is reasonable to suppose
1 For analyses stressing this efficiency problem see Gordon 119801 and Gordon
and Malkiel l9801.—9—
thatthe basic outlines of the existing tax system will be maintained, with
the relatively minor addition of S—I incentive features. It is also the
case that the existing system has solved badly many problems of measure—
ing income from capital, notably in the treatment of owner—occupied houses,
accruing capital gains, and state and municipal bond interest, and in the
absenceof inflation adjustments. If the effect of the S—I incentive is to
reduce reliance on these aspects of the income tax, italsodiminishes the in-
efficiencies associatedwith such defects of income measurement.
Simplicity. It is difficult to say very much in general about
the potential tendency of S—I incentives to complicate further or to
simplify compliance with and enforcement of the tax law. There is a cer-
tain risk that S—I incentives will bring with them hard—to—administer
rules to prevent "abuse", as in the present rules disallowing deduction of
interest traceable to the purchase or holding of tax exempt bonds, or
will require inherently complex calculations, as in the case of some
aspects of inflation adjustment.
One desirable characteristic that might be included under this
heading is the degree to which an S—I incentive automatically adjusts to
a changing rate of inflation. Arguments in favor of proposals, for example,
for accelerated depreciation, often turn on their ability to offset the cur-
rent rate of inflation. The measures typically will be inappropriate for
other rates of inflation, implying the necessity for further rule adjustments
when conditions change. Other S—I incentives may be more or less robust to
varying inflation rates.A Classification of S—I Incentives
As has been indicated, currently employed or discussed measures
to encourage saving and investment can, with a little license, be placed in two
broad categories, the class of consumption tax ("C—tax") rules and the
class of direct grant rules. These rules in turn may be applicable to either
real or financial assets, and they may apply to the purchase or sale of assets
(a stock notion) or to the yield from assets (a flow notion). This generates an
eight way classification.
The usual approach to implementing a consumption tax base ("standard"
C—tax treatment) is to permit the taxpayer to deduct from a conventional income
tax base the net purchase of assets during the accounting period. Various S—I
incentive measures have this character, notably including accelerated depre-
ciation of real assets (the standard C—tax treatment would carry acceleration to
the logical extreme of immediate expensing). Contributions by employers to a
qualified pension plan on behalf of employees are subject to the standard C—tax
treatment, since the procedure is equivalent to paying out the contributions in
wages and allowing the employees to deduct the amounts saved in this form.
Subsequent pension dissaving upon retirement is then included in the employees'
income tax base. Similar rules apply to saving through Keogh Plans and IRA's,
further examples of S—I incentives of the C—tax type.
A classical consumption tax, levied at a constant rate over time for a
given taxpayer, is equivalent in its effect to exempting the yield from saving
or investing from the income tax, and I refer to this as the "alternative"
method of implementing a consumption tax. This approach is also used in
S—I incentives, particularly in the deferral of tax on capital gains accruing in—l 1.-
either real or financial assets and in the reduced rate of tax imposed on such
gains upon realization. Reducing the rate of corporation income tax can also be
viewed as belonging in this class of S—I incentives with respect to real assets.
The exclusion of dividend and interest receipts (up to a limit) from individual
income tax represents an application of the alternative consumption tax treat-
ment to financial assets. One might also include here the exemption of state
and municipal bond interest, although this is evidently not a measure designed
to encourage saving and investment generally.
In addition to these two consumption tax approaches on the markets for
real and financial assets, we can distinguish incentives having the character of
a direct grant, which is not subject to tax or equivalent to a deduction from
the income tax base. The prime example of this in the U.S. is the investment
tax credit (ITc), which provides the investor (who has sufficient tax
liability), in effect, a cash grant equal to a fraction of the cost of a real
asset. Unlike the closely related techniques of accelerated depreciation or imme-
diate expensing of investment outlays, the subsidy provided by the ITC is inde-
pendent of the investorts marginal tax rate.
There is no program in the U.S. system obviously corresponding to this
with respect to saving in the form of financial assets. In other countries,
there exist direct subsidies to saving of a character similar to the U.S.
investment tax credit: the public treasury supplements individual savings by
direct grants, independent of the recipientts marginal tax rate.
For completeness, we maynotethe possibility in principle of S—I
incentives of the yield exemption type analogous to the investment tax credit.—12—
Such measures would involve providing the owner of real or financial assets with
an extra return not subject to income taxation. We would then have four approaches
to the subsidy of each of the two asset types, real and financial, a total of
eight hypothetical subsidy techniques. Thble 1 displays the eight—way
classification. Cells 6, 7 and 8 appear to be essentially empty in the U.S.
today.
In the next section, we look at the way these different incentive
measures work, and interact, under conditions of stable prices (or well indexed
income measurement rules, regardless of inflation).
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II.S—IINCENTIVESIN THE ABSENCE OF INFLATION
Consumption Tax Incentives
To understand the way the different incentives work, how they differ
and how they interact, we are best served by considering their application in a
context with a minimum of complication. Therefore, we focus on the case of an
investment with a risk—free return. To start with, assume away also the gra-
duated structure of tax rates.
It will be sufficient, furthermore, for most of our purposes to study
the impact of the various rules on one particular sort of real investment
opportunity, the exponentially decaying machine. This is the model made fami-
liar by Jorgenson and colleagues.1 A new machine costing one dollar produces a
rate of output valued at c, after allowing for payments to cooperating factors,
and this is thus the rental rate a producer would be prepared to pay for the use
ofthe machine. Ifthe machine is of durability (5 its rate of output declines
at theconstant relative rate (5; the smaller (5,themore durable the machine.
Theoutput rate of an s—year old machine is thus ceS. Since an s—year old
machine is just equivalent to new machines, economic depreciation takes
placeat rate (5eS. It is generally assumed that machines of different durabi—
lities are in use at a given time, and their output rates will differ. When it
is necessary to be explicit about this I write c( 5) for the output rate of a new
machine of durability (5.
Simplewealth maximizing considerations will determine who will wish
to own machines under various conditions. If the market rate of interest is
given by i, a capitalist subject to a marginal tax rate m, will base his
1 See, for example, Jorgenson [1963],Halland Jorgenson [19611._])4_
borrowingand lending on the after tax interest rate, (l—m)i. Such a taxpayer
will be willing to offer for a new machine any amount up to the discounted (at
rate (l—m)i) sum of rental payments on the machine, net of taxes, plus depre-
ciation allowances. This demand price for the real asset is a result of pure
arbitrage considerations, and has nothing to do with the capitalist's time pre—
ference or propensity to save. Since the supply price of a machine is 1, the
elimination of arbitrage profit requires
1 =5 [(l—m)c +m]e_( _m)i)sds . (1)
Explicit integration leads from (1) to the familiar condition of
equilibrium
i =c(5)— cS. (2)
We may describe as the social rate of return, r(S), on an asset of
durability c3 the internal rate of return on a unit of consumption
foregone. That is,
1 f c(s) er())5 ds . ()
Solvingexplicity gives us
r(6) =c(5)—. ())
Conditions (2) and () tell us that in equilibrium with an income tax
the social rate of return on investment in machines of different types is the
same. The allocation is thus characterized by production efficiency.1 While
This has been shown by, among others, Samuelson tl961.—15—
the common social rate of return in this equilibrium equals the interest rate,
i, the savers receive a lower rate of return, (1—m)i =(1—m)r,whether they save
in the form of financial or real assets. Note that as the marginal tax rate in
doesnot appear in equilibrium condition (2), this analysis would continue to
hold with different tax rates applicable to different capitalists.
Accelerated Depreciation. Consider now the way the accelerated depre-
ciation for tax purposes influences the equilibrium outcome. There is no single
interpretation to be given to this notion, but a natural approach in this con-
text is to assume that in reckoning income tax the capitalist is allowed to
treat the machine with actual durability parameter 6 as though it were of dura-
bility 6. For example, since any likely measure of the average effective or
expected lifetime of an asset of type 6 will be inversely proportional to 6,
allowing investors to assume 6* =26could be taken to represent a halving of
service lives for tax purposes.
If the taxation of interest is as before, the no—arbitrage equilibrium
condition with accelerated depreciation is given by
1 [(i—m)c e —(6 +(l—m)i)s+m6*e_(6*+(l_m)i)s] ds ,(5)
which reduces to relationship (6) among rental rate, interest rate, and depre-
ciation and tax parameters:
c =(_m
+6
)(i +6*) . (6)
(l—m)i +6*—i6—
We may verify by substitution that if tax and economic depreciation are the
same (6 =6*),condition (6) reduces to (2). Increasing (5*relativeto (5 reduces
the equilibrium rental rate, given i, and results in the return to savers,
(l—m)i, being higher in relation to the social rate of return, c—S.
If accelerated depreciation is carried to the extreme of instantaneous
write—off, 5 =°o, equilibriumcondition (6) reduces to
c =(l—m)j +6 • (7)
This is the characteristic equilibrium condition for a flat rate income
tax system in which real investment is given standard consumption tax
treatment. Since c—6 is equated over all durabilities, this equili-
brium is characterized by production efficiency, and since c—S =(l—m)i,the
return to the saver, (l—m)i, is just equated to the social yield on real in-
vestment. Note that in this equilibrium the market interest rate exceeds the
social rate of return by the factor l/(l—m), so that the tax on interest just
takes away the excess over the social return.
Returning to condition (6), we may inquire about the relationship be-
tween (5 and 6* needed to assure that in equilibrium the social return, c( 6) —6,
is equated at some value r for all asset types, a condition for production
efficiency. If we let 6*((5) stand for the depreciation rate allowed under the
tax laws when the true depreciation rate is 6, a little algebra shows that pro-




It is assumed here that the rate of return to the saver, (l—m)i, is below the
social rate of return on investment, r.
Condition (8) may be more readily interpreted if we state the objec-
tive of the accelerated depreciation scheme to be obtaining a specified propor-
tional difference, ,betweenthe interest rate and the common social rate of
return on investment, that is, to effect in equilibrium the relationship r =
(l.-)i.With this substitution, (8) becomes (assumingless than m)
=(i-m)i + m ()
Increasingthe degree of acceleration toward effectively eliminating
the tax wedge between private and social return involves settingcloser to m.
From (9), we see this does involve raising toward ,but(9) also tells us
that to avoid inefficiency in the allocation of investment it is necessary to
add a term, related to the interest rate, that itself tends to .
Toget some sort of feel for the inefficiency which might be engen-
dered by failing to calibrate the tax depreciation appropriately to the interest
rate and the applicable marginal tax rate, consider the particular case
described in Table 2.—18—
Table 2
Illustrative Acceleration Schedule























'Calculatedaccording to text expression (9).
2Derived from text expression (6).
The first column of Table 2 shows the true depreciation rate of assets. The
second shows the tax depreciation rate required to obtain the effect of a fifty—
percent relief from a fifty percent marginal tax rate, if the before—tax
interest rate is twelve percent. Notable is the fact that the ratio of tax
depreciation to true depreciation rate, near 2 for assets with an expected life-
time of two years, rises to 5 for assets with expected fifty year lives.
Depreciation of long—lived assets must be "more accelerated" than that of short—
lived assets. Failing to calibrate the degree of acceleration in this way,
by employing instead a simple proportional increase in depreciation rates,—19—
disadvantagesmore durable relative to less durable assets.
The third column of Table 2 illustrates this by showing the social
rate of return in equilibrium on assets of different durabilities when instead
of the usual acceleration scheme a simple proportional shortening of lives is
employed.Inthis example the proportionality factor is set to achieve the same
incentiveeffectas the neutral pattern for assets with an expected life of ten
years.The result is a spread of roughly two percentage points, or twenty—five
percent, between the equilibrium social return on the two—year asset and that on
the fifty—year asset. This difference is the pure social gain that could be
obtainedat the margin by shifting investment from the least to the most durable
assets in the table.
In assessing whether a given differential in rates of return or tax on
rates of return is ttlargeU, it iswell to keep in mind the proverbial power
ofcompound interest. With fifty years of reinvestment at ten percent, $1 accu-
mulates to nearly $150; at eight percent it accumulates to a little over $50.
It thus maymakesense to be concerned about differences in equilibrium rates
of return that appear to be small.
Before leaving this exercise in calculating tax depreciation rates we
should note that the assumption we have employed of a fixed interest rate
involves a sort of self—contradiction. In view of the arbitrage potential, a
fixed interest rate implies a fixed incentive to save, unless the tax rate
declines. If the new equilibrium is to involve a larger amount of consumption
foregone, it will presumably require a higher interest rate. Presumably also,
the tax rate will need to be higher than otherwise to cover the revenue losses—20—
to cover the revenue losses due to accelerated depreciation. If the tax depre-
ciation rule is not well designed, it is possible that it would do no more than
generate a higher interest rate, higher tax rate and some dead weight loss.'
Much the same can be said of any S—I incentive.
While exponential depreciation does not encompass all investment
opportunities, we can learn several lessons from this analysis. We see that a
mechanical compressing of the life of an asset for tax purposes will not in
general generate an appropriate balancing of incentives across short— and long—
lived assets, that the adjustment required to maintain efficient resource use
may be moderately complicated to derive, and that it will in general depend upon
the interest rate and the applicable marginal tax rate. However, the problem of
designing a schedule of accelerated depreciation allowances is made to appear
simpler in this case than it is when other possible patterns of the decline of
asset value are taken into account. Each alternative requires, in principle,
its own version of (9).
Arguably, this says nothing more than that in this sphere as in
others, there is a problem of choosing a sufficiently good approximation. A
further oversimplification is not so easily dealt with. The marginal tax rate
in the equilibrium condition, (6), and in the expression for a neutral acceleration
schedule, (9), is not a constant. Taxpayers with different marginal tax rates
will have different demand prices for the same real asset. Establishing
equilibrium requires assuming constraints on arbitrage (for example, borrowing
-Foran example see Bradford E1980; pp. )42—5O.—21—
limits), or a mechanism that produces its own constraints. We shall return to
this issue in the context of an alternative approach to the application of con-
sumption tax rules to real investment.
Partial Expensing of Real Investment. We know that taxation according
to income properly measured, using economic depreciation, does not upset the
aspect of production efficiency which we are studying, nor does taxation
according to consumption principles, which involves immediate expensing of
investment outlays. One suspects then that a "mixture" of the two approaches,
appropriately designed, should share this virtue. As Harberger [19791 has
recently argued, such is indeed the case.1
Specifically, consider the effect of allowing in this system the imme-
diate expensing for tax purposes of a fraction a of the investment in the
machine. This means that for given value of i, the demand price of the capita-
list is increased by ma less the loss in value of depreciation allowances. If
the basis for depreciation is reduced by just the amount expensed, elimination
of arbitrage profits implies
1 f[(1—rn)c +m(l—a)]e61_m5 ds +ma . (10)
Again, explicit integration plus some algebra reduces (io) to
c —= (1—mcx)i . (ii)
Thus, for the case of exponential depreciation (and this generalizes
easily to all patterns of depreciation) equilibrium with a flat rate income tax
1 Auerbach [1979a} confirms this point for the case of exponential depreciation.—22—
allowing partial expensing of investment outlays, together with economic depre-
ciation applied for tax purposes to the unexpensed basis, is characterized by
production efficiency in the sense that the social rate of return to marginal
investment in capital of all durabilities (in use) is the same, and given by




while the rate of return received by the saver in either form is
(l—m)i = r (13)
The relationship holding when immediate expensing of all real investment is
allowed is found by setting c=l, whereby (l—m)i=r. The return to the saver
equals the social return. This repeats the result above that immediate
expensing of investment accomplishes the elimination of the tax "wedge" on the
return to saving and thus effects consumption taxation, even though interest
income is subject to tax (and interest outlays are allowed as a deduction).1
Note, though, that, as in the case of accelerated depreciation, the
single marginal tax rate now enters the equilibrium condition. If the rela-
tionship between the interest rate, i, and the equilibrium rental rate, c(S), is
given by (11), the demand price for a unit machine of a taxpayer with marginal
1This was one of the methods proposed by the Meade Committee for implementing
a consumption tax in the U.K., where the income tax is imposed at essentially
a single flat rate for the great bulk of taxpayers. [Institute for Fiscal
Studies, 1918; ch. 81.—23—
rate rn', possibly different from m, will be given by
S +(l—m')(l+(m'—m)a)i • (lIt)
+ (1—rn')i
This demand price (obtained by evaluating the right—hand side of (io) for
rn=m', given (11)), derived from pure arbitrage considerations, will be greater
than the supply price, 1, if rn'>m and less if m'<ni.This accords with
intuition, most clearly for the case a=1 •Forwe know that the application of
consumption tax principles to the real investment amounts to exempting the yield
from tax. Any taxpayer can then be assured the rate of return r=c— 3.This will
just equal the after tax interest rate for the taxpayer with marginal rate m.
For the taxpayer with rate rn'>m, the after tax return on lending or the cost
of borrowing is less. Hence the situation presents an opportunity for arbitrage
profit, with the high bracket taxpayer borrowing to finance the acquisition of
machines, each time earning a pure profit at the expense of the tax system.
Although one imist be cautious about a mechanical interpretation of
this model, it is instructive to push it to an equilibrium. Such is permitted
by the impossibility of holding negative quantities of the real asset (short
sales of real assets seeming too far fetched). Tax arbitrage profits are elimi-
nated when the marginal rate applicable to equilibrium condition (ii) is rninax,
the highest rate among taxpayers. At that point, all real assets are owned by
top—bracket taxpayers, while the portfolios of lower bracket households are
entirely in loans. The yield on saving by the top bracket taxpayer is related
to the social return according to (13) (with m=mmax) while taxpayers with lowerrates obtain higher after tax yields in the usual way. Those with a suf-
ficiently low marginal rate (below cxinmax) receive a return on saving in excess
of r. When a=1, all taxpayers below the maximum tax bracket will have an after
tax interest rate in excess of the social rate of return on investment.
Adjusting the Treatment of Interest. The phenomenon of lightly taxed
assets migrating to the portfolios of high bracket taxpayers is not a new
discovery. What seems yet to be recognized is the possibility of offsetting the
effect through varying the rate of inclusion of interest receipts in (and
deduction of interest outlays from) the income tax base. That is to say, a par-
tial standard consumption tax treatment of real investment will be compatible
with an appropriately partial alternative consumption tax treatment of borrowing
and lending. The argument is general, not dependent on the exponential depre-
ciation assumption, and is simply a matter of discovering the inclusion rate
needed to foreclose arbitrage profit.
Because of the tax rebate, the taxpayer with marginal rate m can
finance a fraction ma of the outlay on real assets by the tax reduction due
to the immediate expensing of the fraction a. In a pure arbitrage transaction
the remainder is financed by borrowing at interest rate i.If a fraction
y of interest payments is deductible from the tax base together with a fraction
(i—a) of d, the decline in value of the asset during the period, the net of tax
proceeds from rental will be (l—m)c +m(y(i—cn)i+(i—cx)d).This must cover the
sum of interest payments and the actual loss in asset value to the holder. The
former is simply (l—am)i. The latter differs from d because of the treasuryt S
claimon the value of the asset. A decline of d in the market value of the—25—
asset implies a decline of (1—rnn)d in the value of the private owner's share.
Thus the no arbitrage profit condition is given by
(1—rn)c+m(y(l—cxm)i+(1—a)d)=(1—cm)i+(l—am)d, (15)
whichreducesto
=( (1_1m)(1_ma)+d . (16)
1-rn
The coefficient of i in (i6) will be identically 1 if
l—mc (ii)
When the proportion of interest allowed as a deduction is given
by y,definedin (ii), taxpayers in all brackets are indifferent be-
tween lending and purchasing real assets. The equilibrium interest rate
just equals c.-d, the social rate of return on real investment, and
the rate of return received by the saver is (1—mi)i. When c=1, the
purchasers of real assets are allowed immediate expensing. The corres-
ponding value of y'iszero: interest is not subject to tax. Both rules
are precisely those of a consumption tax system with tax rates constant
over time for each taxpayer, although graduated across taxpayers. When
cz=O,realassets are allowed only economic depreciation as a deduction—26—
in calculating the tax base, the principle of true income taxation. In
this case, y1; interest is taxed in full. Table 3 shows the values
of y for various combinations of write—off rate and marginal tax bracket.
Table 3
Rate of Inclusion of Interest Income and Deduction
of Interest Expense Corresponding to
Various Rates of Expensing Real Investment
(percent)
according to text expression (12) for y, with a =
allowedas immediate deduction and m investor's
The reader may verify that the demand price for a dollar's worth of
exponentially depreciating real assets, given by the right—hand side of (io),is
exactly one dollar, independent of the taxpayer's marginal rate, when the






































fraction of real asset
marginal tax rate.—21—
Cells (2) and (3). Thus far we have focussed on the interactions be-
tween standard C—tax treatment of real investment (cell (i) of Table 1) and alter-
native C—tax treatment of interest (cell c)4) of Table 1). The analysis of stan-
dard C—tax treatment of financial assets (cell (2) of Table 1), typified by
Keogh Plan saving is straightforward. As far as its interaction with the
appropriate treatment of interest is concerned, the argument is basically the
same as applied to real investment. The important difference is that there is
now no possibility to equilibrate away tax arbitrage profits through a differen-
tial in the returns on the two forms of saving.
To illustrate, if saving in a pension plan could be used to secure a
loan subject to conventional income tax rules, there would be a tax arbitrage
profit obtainable through borrowing (to make the example particularly graphic,
let it be from the pension fund itself) and depositing the funds, together with
the tax refund due upon deducting the deposit, in the pension fund. This
involves no change in consumption and no real change in portfolio. But the
interest on the borrowing is deductible, while the interest on the offsetting
"lending' is not taxed. Since the underlying asset is exactly the same, there
is no possibility for this profit to be eliminated through yield differentials:
the earnings of the fund are the interest paid on the borrowing.
Controlling this arbitrage profit requires either direct limits on the
arbitrage process or an offsetting change in the treatment of interest.
(Another possibility is found in the endogenous adjustment of marginal rates
over the life cycle; see Bradford [1980, pp. 47'—49I). Current rules follow the first
approach, setting ceilings on annual additions to tax—favored pension savings,
restricting the pledging of pension wealth as loan collateral, prohibiting or—28—
penalizing withdrawal of funds before retirement, and so forth. While these
rules no doubt inhibit arbitrage profit, they also tend to eliminate the incen-
tive effect of the programs. Pn individual who has reached the ceiling
confronts the usual (l—m)i yield on incremental savings, as does one suf-
ficiently deterred by the restrictions on the pension asset to stop short of the
statutory ceiling. Significantly lifting these restrictions on the standard C—
tax treatment of financial assets calls for associated changes in the taxation
of interest, along the lines discussed in connection with the standard C—tax
treatment of real investment.
Discussion of cell (3) of Table 1 requires a closer look at the rules
for taxing sales of depreciable assets (importantly real estate) and certain tax
favored activities, such as ship building and timber production. While there is
no doubt an important story to be told here, it extends beyond my knowledge of
the rules. However, we can readily see that there is a potential for
"double—dipping,' with assets subject to the incentive effects of both standard
and alternative C—tax treatment. This would have the consequences of production
inefficiency and portfolio distortion as a function of marginal tax brackets of
the sort analyzed in connection with standard C—tax treatment of real investment
with no change in the taxation of interest.
Direct Grant Incentives
We can move more quickly through the discussion of direct grant
incentives since the basic analytical approach is now familiar. Further-
more, there is as a practical matter only one program in question, that of—29—
a direct subsidytoreal investment expenditures. This happens to be ad-
ministered through the tax system, in the form of the ITC. Twofeatures
distinguish it from a directly appropriated grant. First, the credit may only
be applied to settlement of positive tax liability. This may mean the subsidy
is not available to many firms at a given time. Certainly it introduces incen-
tives for somewhat artificial financing arrangements and creates administrative
complexity, an aspect of the ITC about which I have nothing new to say. Second,
the subsidy is not reflected in the basis for depreciation. That is, while the
cost of an asset to the taxpayer is the price net of tax credit, depreciation
allowances are calculated as though the full price had been paid. This is
nothing more than a mismeasurement of income, and the appropriate analysis is
the same as that above in connection with accelerated depreciation.1
Zero arbitrage—profit equilibrium with an ITC correctly calibrated for
durability, together with allowances for depreciation calculated on the basis of
the purchase price of the asset net of tax credit, will be characterized by pro-
duction efficiency in the sense we have been using, and neutrality with respect
to the portfolios of wealth holders. The latter property, indeed, depends only
on the use of economic depreciation (of the net of credit asset value) for tax
purposes. We may see these conclusions easily in the exponential depreciation
case, where the elimination of arbitrage profits requires
1 f(i—m)c+m(1—k)6]e( (1m)i)s ds +k , (18)
1 An early treatment of this is found in Brown 1962; for further details see
Bradford l919J.—30—
where k is the fraction of the unit purchase price of the asset available
as a credit against tax. Upon explicit integration and simplification, this
condition reduces to
c —= (1—k)i—k5 . (19)
We see that, as m does not appear in the equilibrium condition, arbitrage pro-
fit opportunity is eliminated for individuals in all tax brackets by (19).
However, to obtain equality of the social rate of return, c—5, over all asset
types, CS,inuse in equilibrium, a particular relationship, k(S), between
the credit rate and the durability of the asset is required. It follows from
(19) that to obtain a given value, r, of the social rate of return requires
k(S) to satisfy
k(CS) =1-(r (20)
This relationship is illustrated in Table 4.Inthe second column
are shown the credit rates necessary to obtain a social rate of return of
9 percent where the associated interest rate is 12 percent, assumptions
paralleling those of Table 2.(The savers thus receive a rate of return of—31—
(1—m)12 percent, depending upon individual marginal tax rates.) It will
be seen that a considerable variation is required to implement a subsidy
that does not distort the choice of asset lives. To give an idea of the
effect of failing to take into account the need to calibrate the credit for
durability, the third column of Table 14 shows the social rate of return on
assets of different lives when a flat rate credit of 13.6 percent is ap-
plied uniformly. This is the credit rate which induces a social yield of
9 percent for an asset with a ten—year expected life (still assuming an
interest rate of 12 percent). Because of the bias toward short—lived assets
this entails, investment in less durable assets is driven to the point of
very low social yield (it would go to zero for an asset with zero life)
while the social rate of return on long—lived assets exceeds 9 percent
(tending to lO.)4 percent for a non—depreciating asset).
Table 14
IllustrativeNeutral Tax Credit Schedule
and Equilibrium Social Rate of Return
Using a Flat Rate
Actual Neutral ITC Social Return (c—cS))







1Calculatedaccording to text expression (20) for r=.09, i=.12.
2Calculated according to text expression (19) for i=.12, k=.136.—32—
Certain general conclusions emerge from this discussion of direct
grant incentives for the purchase of real assets. First, if economic depre-
ciation of the net of credit cost of the asset is employed in calculating
taxable income, we do not encounter differential effects on the demand price for
assets as a function of the applicable marginal tax rate ——effectswhich called
for a change in the taxation of interest under the consumption tax approach to
S—I incentives. A corollary is that increasing the rate of credit does not
affect the relative taxation of the returns to saving as invariesacross
taxpayers. In the case of the consumption tax approach, as the level of incen-
tive is increased, the rate of return on consumption forgone obtained by all
savers tends toward equality with the social yield on investment. In the direct
grant approach, as the subsidy level is increased the whole structure of indivi-
dual rewards to saving goes up relative to the social return on investment, but
there is no tendency toward equating the private yields of taxpayers in dif-
ferent marginal rate brackets.
Designing a credit structure to avoid production inefficiency may be
difficult.1 While in the particular case of exponential depreciation the for-
mula is not particularly complex, it requires knowledge of both the target
social rate of return and the interest rate that will call forth the private
saving necessary to generate precisely that rate of return. Furthermore, a dif-
ferent formula applies to each pattern of depreciation.2 In view of the dif—
E. Cary Brown [1962] shows that one way to achieve the correct calibration of
the credit is to structure it as flat "net credit," that is, a fixed percen-
tage of the difference between the cost of the machine and the present value
(at the net of tax interest for that investor) of economic depreciation
allowances. Since this is equivalent to calibration of the ttgross credit," it
is subject to the same problems.
2 For examples of the formulas applicable to other patterns of depreciation see
Bradford [19191.—33—
ficulty tax authorities have in determining the facts about depreciation, a
requirement that the credit rules be written with a detailed knowledge is a
severe one.
Finally, we may note that the consumption tax approach to S—I incen-
tives tends to substitute rules with few measurement problems for the income tax
rules which are subject to many problems. The greater the C—tax type of
incentive, the less important are the shortcomings of the income tax residual.
The direct grant approach does not share this property.
III. S_I INCENTIVES WITH INFLATION
Background on Inflation and Taxation
The previous section considered the properties of various S—I incen-
tive measures under conditions of stable prices. Inflation brings with it new
problems of income measurement.1 An ideal indexing system would solve those
problems, and if we had such a system, the preceding analysis would be all that
were needed. We do not, however, and the notion that an extra tax on the reward
to saving is a consequence of inflation has motivated such of the recent move-
ment to enact S—I incentives. In this section we consider, still in the simple
model, the consequences of steady state inflation and the effectiveness of
various measures to offset it.
To start with, let us review the way in which an unindexed tax
systemaffects the equilibrium in the market for real assets, first in a
flat rate tax system. With a steady rate of inflation ii,thenominal flow of
rentals obtained from a machine of age s is ce(1)5, while under historic cost
depreciationthe allowance for tax purposes is The no—arbitrage—profit
condition becomes
1 For a general treatment see Stiglitz l98O._3)4_
1=f[(i—m)ce(6_(1—m)i)s +me—((1—m)i)sJ ds. (21)
Provided iiisless than+(1—m)i,this condition can be reduced to
c =( ) (i+) • (22)
When lr=Othisreduces in turn to condition (2).
We can see from (22) that dth historic costdepreciation and no
indexing of interest inflation influences both the relativesocial yields from
assets of different durabiljties and the real returnreceived after taxes by
savers. The latter is given by (1—m)i—'rr, and thus whether itis increased or
decreased by inflation depends upon whether theequilibrium interest rate
increases by more or less than 1/(1—rn)per point increase in inflation.1
Letting i stand for the real interest rate, such anadjustment would imply
Tr 1=1+— . (23) 1-rn
An adjustment of this magnitude isapparently counter factual in the
U.S. recently-. But we might ask whether it islikely even in our simple analy-
tical model. Such an adjustment wouldimply no change in the equilibriuni
productivity-, c, (also called the "gross rental rate") of
non—depreciating
'This required adjustment in I tocompensate savers for inflation has been
stressed by Feldstein f1976J. For an attempt torationalize the fact that
interest rates have moved with inflation at mostaccording to Fisher's law (point
for point) in the U.S. in recentyears see Feldstein and Summers [19y8].
Feldstein, Green and Sheshinski [19781 explore models of interestdeter-
mination under conditions of inflation.Stiglitz [1980J has emphasized that
with imperfect indexing the incidence of inflationdepends upon the measures
taken to maintain adherence to the government'sbudget constraint. General
conclusions about the effect of inflation thusrequire modeling the
government' s reaction.-35-
machines,as can be verified by substitution of (23) into (22) for the case
of cS =0.The same analysis leads to the conclusion that the equilibrium gross
rental rate (and hence the social rate of return) would necessarily rise for all
other durabilities. If the law of diminishing returns applies to investments of
different durabilities, this condition would imply a reduction in the capital
stock in the aggregate. If the capital stock desired by private wealth holders
is a declining function of the private rate of return, this is incompatible
with the assumption, expressed in (23), of a constant value of (1—rn)i—x.In
this sense there is a presumption that, absent correction of income measurement,
inflation will lead to a decline in the real private rate of return, (1—m)i—x, a
decline in the overall capital stock, but an increase in the stock of the most
durable forms of capital.
This is in accord with Auerbach's [19191 analysis but in contrast to
Feldstein's [l98o view that inflation biases the pattern of investment in favor
of short—lived assets. The basis for Feldstein's conclusion is the behavior of
what he terms the "net cost" of a dollar of investment, defined to be one minus
the sum of the investment credit and the present value of real depreciation
allowances, where a constant real discount rate is employed in the evaluation.
If we let r stand for the latter rate, k(S), the investment credit allowed for a
machine of durability ô, and CH the net cost per dollar of investment under
historical cost depreciation,





Clearlythe net cost of neither an infinitely durable asset (=o), nor an instan-
taneously depreciating asset (=),isaffected by inflation. In between an
increase in iiincreasesCH, with the relative increase rising and then falling
with 5. The range of parameter values considered by Feldstein was drawn mostly
from the rising segment of this relationship.
A shortcoming of this approach is that it leaves unexplained the
discount rate used by investors, which is treated as a given. In our analysis,
the discount rate is a market price and its place in the calculation is deter-
mined by pure arbitrage considerations. As a market price, the discount rate
may itself be influenced by the economic environment, including the rate of
inflation. I find the arbitrage argument persuasive, particularly where (as in
both analyses) debt and real investment are treated as though riskiess.
All of the analysis thus far is based on the assumption of a single
marginal income tax rate, m. We can see from (22) that with unadjusted
depreciation, the demand price for investment goods will vary with the tax
bracket of the investor. The rental rate in (22), which is the minimum required
to cover taxes, depreciation and interest, declines with m.If the rental
rate and interest rate are such as to permit a taxpayer with marginal tax rate
in to break even (on purchase of a machine of given durability), taxpayers in
higher brackets will have an opportunity for pure arbitrage profit through
borrowing to finance real investment while low bracket taxpayers will want to
sell machines and lend. This is a situation similar to that discussed above.
In that case equilibrium in the model required all real investment to be in-31-
thehands of tap—bracket taxpayers. Whiletoelaborate on the details would
require more space than merited, there does not seem to be any analagous way of
achieving equilibrium in this case. Just how actual markets clear is not
obvious, but it is safe to say that without without correction of income
measurement for tax purposes inflation generates distortions in the composition
of both the real capital stock and individual portfolios.
Inflation Adjustment. Full inflation adjustment of the accounts would
involve, first, converting all dollar amounts in the calculation of the tax to
consistent units, that is, dollars of equal purchasing power. A natural choice
of units is current dollars. Inflation adjustment thus calls for increasing the
basis of assets sold in the calculation of capital gains and in the deter-
mination of depreciation allowances, as well as for similar changes in inventory
accounting. These adjustments are conceptually straight forward.
Less obvious are the changes called for in the treatment of interest.
In principle, the value of the lender's asset after the payment of interest is
exactly what it was at the beginning of the period. Payments considered
"interest" in the usual income tax rules are intended to have this character,
and, by and large, they do when prices are stable. Thus, if a depositor
withdraws the interest paid by a savings bank during a year, the nominal
balance is constant. Regarding this interest as income is thus correct when
there is no inflation, but when there is inflation it overstates the income of
the depositor and understates that of the bank by the loss in purchasing power
of the nominal balance over the year. Correcting the accounts calls for asso-
ciating with interest payments a sum corresponding to the bank balance ——presum-
ably one would call it the "principal" ——andallowing the creditor a deduction
for the loss in purchasing power of the principal during the year, while-38-
assessingthe debtor with additional income in equal amount.'
Following this procedure, the net of tax interest rate, i.e., the
discount rate applicable to nominal cash flows, becomes (1—rn)i +mn.In the
case of steady inflation, this is equivalent to adjusting interest payments to
reproduce the effect of taxing on the basis of the real interest rate, i—if. IlTt
may be readily verified that adjusting both the real and the financial sides of
the accounts in this way restores the calculus of equilibrium to full equiva-
lence to the no inflation case with the same real interest rate.
Because the adjustment of interest called for involves equal and oppo-
site changes in the tax bases of debtors and creditors, precisely the same eco-
nomic effect can be accomplished by a change in the interest rate in a flat—rate
tax world. To see this, note that with only depreciation allowances adjusted
condition (21) becomes




1 For detailed discussions of the problems of indexing the income tax for infla-
tion see Aaron [1976] ,Bulowand Shoven [1975; 1916], Fabricant [1918].-39-
Since (26) implies c—5 is the same for allwe conclude that indexing real
investment accounting will restore the property of production efficiency to
capital market equilibrium. If, furthermore, the nominal interest adjusts
according to (23), (25) implies in turn that
c =I+ , (21)
which is to say the real rental rate and after tax real interest rate are
unaffected by inflation. Note again the large responsiveness of the interest
rate to inflation required to obtain this outcome. The nominal rate must
increase by enough to cover the inflation premium plus the tax due on that
premium.
Unfortunately, if marginal tax rates vary across individuals,
condition (26) tells us that portfolio distortion is still a problem. There
will be opportunities for tax arbitrage profits, with high bracket taxpayers
borrowing to buy real assets and low bracket taxpayers selling real assets to
lend at interest. The result is pressure toward the sorting of portfolios along
lines already discussed.
To sum up, it is possible by reasonably simple methods to correct for
the effects of inflation on the tax base arising from real investment.
Furthermore, this would be sufficient in a flat rate tax system, provided nomi-
nal interest rates were sufficiently flexible. However, with graduated rates,
there will be portfolio biases unless the treatment of interest is adjusted as
well. This is a much more difficult matter administratively. Current
discussion of S—I incentives emphasizes their potential to offset inflation.-no-
One objection to this is obvious, that an incentive designed to offset one
inflation rate will be inappropriate at another. Not so widely recognized is
the fact that none of the measures under consideration addresses the need to
simulate correction of interest transactions. Hence as we consider next the
properties of S—I incentives under inflation, we know that this is one problem
which they will not solve.
S—I Incentives and Inflation
The way in which accelerated depreciation or the investment credit
fits into this scheme requires no new analytical materials. From the discussion
thus far, we know that these measures can not provide a general solution to the
problems posed by inflation. The situation calls for a second—best analysis, to
determine whether they could effect an improvement on equilibrium with existing
rules.
The principal difficulty seems to be modeling the effect of inflation
on the interest rate.It is tempting to deal with this by appealing to the
observation that the interest rate moves roughly point—for—point with the infla-
tion rate. However, consideration of the problem of setting depreciation
allowances to maintain a fixed rate of return under this assumption simply draws
attention to the paradox that it represents, namely, an inexplicably low nominal
interest rate. For the adjustment required is a cut in depreciation allowances.
To see this, let be the depreciation rate allowed for tax purposes.
The zero arbitrage profit equilibrium condition, under the assumption of
Fisher's law, is then-4l-
1 =1(l-m)ce( (1m)i)5 +mä*e_(*+(1_m)i)sIds . (28)
We can see that setting the tax depreciation allowance below the economic level
to the extent of the inflation rate, that is =5—ir (making the tax depreciation
rate negative for the most durable assets), leads the equilibrium condition to
reduce to
c =i+S, (29)
and since, by assumption, i =i÷ir,where i is the real interest rate, this in
turn implies
c =i+5 . (30)
To rationalize Fisher's law thus calls for, in effect, taking into the tax base
the purely nominal capital gains on real assets, and under this condition, real
investment will be unaffected by inflation.
The difficulty is in explaining how the assumed relationship between
interest rate and inflation rate could characterize equilibrium without the
noted cut in depreciation allowances. y conjecture is that the apparent vali-
dity of Fisher's law results from some combination of failing to account
correctly for the riskiness of debt and incomplete adjustment of markets.— —
Theanalysis above of equilibriumunderC—tax treatment of real
investment and graduated rates suggest we should anticipate an interest rate
adjustment close to that required to maintain the after—tax real return to high
bracket taxpayers. Jorgenson has also recommended working with the assumption
that the corporate tax rate, or a marginal tax rate of roughly 50 percent, would
dominate the arbitrage between the real capital and lending markets. whereas
Fisher's law asserts a point for point adjustment of minimal interest to
inflation, this assumption involves a 1/(1—rn) point increase in nominal
interest rate per point increase in the inflation rate. We know that indexing
real investment returns will justify this result and lead to efficient
investment. In view of the difficulty of implementing indexation however, we
may wish to consider acceleration as an approximation if the rate of inflation
is expected to be constant.
It turns out that for the exponential depreciation case this is rela-
tively simple. After integration and some algebra the zero—arbitrage—profit
equilibrium condition (28), when combined with our interest rate assumption, can
be written as:





In order that the equilibrium with inflation rate, 'ir, be the same as that with
zero inflation, tax depreciation, 5, should be set to render zero the coef-
ficient of S on the right—hand side of (31). This in turn requires setting 5
according to the formula:-3-
(32)
Note that under this interest rate adjustment assumption an increase
in depreciation allowances is called for. The required adjustment is rather
sensitive to the assumed real interest rate, i. For example, for
m .5, .09and x= .1, (32) implies the tax depreciation rate should be
about three times the economic rate; for .03,tax depreciation should be at
nearly eight times the economic rate. To get a feel for what this might mean in
terms of service lives, we might interpret the "life" of an exponentially depre-
ciating asset to be the point at which more specified fraction (eq. 1/8) is
exhausted. This would imply service lives inversely proportional to S.Thus
(32) would call for assets to be depreciated (on a declining balance basis)
assuming lives roughly one third of those used in the absence of inflation for i
assumed equal to nine percent, one eighth for i assumed to be three percent.
C—Tax Rules and Inflation. One of the virtues of consumption tax
rules is their indifference to inflation. A numerical example will make this
clear. Take the case of an individual with a 50 percent marginal rate who
wishes to save $100. Under the standard C—tax rules, he would nominally "save"
$200, but would receive a tax rebate of $100 due to the resulting deduction,
thereby forgoing just $100 in consumption. With stable prices and a 10 percent
interest rate, the $200 would increase to $220 by the end of a year. The indi-
vidual now has the option of "dissaving" $220, paying the associated tax of $110
and increasing consumption by $110, thus obtaining the full 10 per cent return
on postponed consumption. By the alternative C—tax rules of exempting the yield
on saving, the ten percent return is obtained directly._424
Now suppose the situation is one of 100 percent per annum inflation.
If the real interest rate is unchanged, $100 set aside in the first period will
increase to $220 in the second period. The saver subject to the alternative C—
tax rule of yield exemption obviously continues to receive a 10 percent real
yield on consumption foregone. This is so because the $100 given up in the first
period is equivalent to the $200 return of principal in the second period, while
the $20 interest is equivalent to $10 of first period consumption. The same out-
come obtains for the saver subject to standard C—tax treatment. The $200
"saving" involves foregoing $100 of consumption in the first period, while
"dissaving" of the $1O accumulated by the second period is divided between $220
in taxes and $220 of increased consumption, exactly the same terms enjoyed by
the conventional saver with exempt returns.
It is thus the case that the real effect of a flat rate C—tax
system is independent of the rate of inflation. The same thing will hold
for a graduated rate system in which the rate structure is corrected for
inflation. This adjustment, the easy part of inflation indexing, is sometimes
called in the tax policy jargon "type I indexing," and it is the only sort of
tax correction that seems to have a significant political appeal. Absent type—I
indexing there is a tendency for inflation to subject the future dissaving
corresponding to current saving to a higher rate of tax, and thereby inflation
may interact even with C—tax rules.
We may easily verify the propositions about flat—rate C—tax rules
under inflation for the case of exponential depreciation. With the interest.-j45—
rateadjusting point for point with the inflation rate, the no—arbitrage—profit
condition with standard C—tax treatment of real investment and no inclusion or
deduction of interest becomes
1 =01 (l—m)c ds +m, (33)
which reduces, as expected, to
c—6i . (3))
Whilefull application of C—tax rules is simultaneously an S—Iincen-
tive anda cure for inflation—induced measurement problems, partial application
of C—tax rules, involving partial expensing of new investment and partial inclu-
sion of interest income in the tax base, only partially solves these problems.
The portion of the investment that is in effect taxed as income is subject
to all of the difficulties due to defects in income measurement, including those
associated with inflation. These include increased effective rate of taxation
with inflation and pressure on portfolio composition, with high bracket tax-
payers seeking to borrow from low bracket taxpayers to finance purchase of real
assets. This suggests the continued importance of developing rules to measure
income correctly or to impose a tax burden on investment equivalent to that
resulting from correct income measurent.— —
TheAuerbach—Jorgenson First—Year Write—Off Scheme
In this connection it is appropriate to digress from the Subject of
S—I incentives to consider a suggestion put forward recently by Alan Auerbach
and Dale Jorgenson [19801.1 They address themselves to the notion that
correcting depreciation allowances for inflation is too complex for practical
administration. Under their proposal, as an alternative to current deduction
of inflation—adjusted depreciation allowances, investors are allowed a single
deduction at the time of acquisition of the asset equal to the present value of
the appropriate stream of real depreciation deductions, where a real discount
rate is applied in the calculation. This procedure is intended to accomplish
the effect of indexing historical—cost based depreciation allowances for changes
in the general price levels but to be simpler in implementation. Such
complexity as there is is embodied in the derivation of tables by the tax
authorities, specifying the allowance for each type of asset.
The characteristics of this scheme emerge immediately if we note
that it involves eliminating the current depreciation allowances, as seen
in the terme( (l—m)i)s in the cash flow stream of expression (25)
for the current—depreciation adjustment case, and replacing them with a
lump sum initial deduction of
ds ,
1According to Joseph Pechman [1980] the Auerbach—Jorgenson proposal is a
rediscovery of an idea of Nicholas Kaldor.- -
wherethe tildas on 5 and i indicate the use of forecasted values of
these variables. It follows immediately that the two schemes are wholly
equivalent if the term iT —(l—m)iis equal to it —(l—m)i.The
practical promise of the method, insofar as a reasonably exact substitute
for inflation indexing is desired, depends upon determining the correct
value of it —(i—m)r.
This involves two difficulties. First is the necessity to employ
a discount factor taking into account the individual tax bracket of the
investor. Second is the necessity to incorporate the relationship
between it and i to the adjustment. As we have seen this is problematical. The
scheme works out precisely if the taxation of in terest is also adjusted for
inflation. Then the real after—tax interest rate for all taxpayers will be
(1—m)i, and this replaces —(iT— (l—m)) in calculation of the first year depre-
ciation allowance. Since i is tyically assumed constant, it is reasonably
straightforward to adjust the allowance for differences in m, if m is known.
Table 5 illustrates under the assumption i=.03. To give an idea of the sen-
sitivity of the scheme to the discount rate assumed, Table 5 also shows the
allowances for i.O9.— —
Table5
IllustrativeFirst Year Deduction




Marginal Tax Rate, rn
(percent)





15 53 57 69
(20) (22) (27) (31) (1)
65 68 77 85
(38) (l) (18) (53) (65)
79 81 85 87 92
() (58) (65)(69)(9)
95 95 97 97 98
(86) (81) (90) (92)()
Entries (in percent) show the percentage first—year write—off equivalent to
economic dereciation allowances, calculated according to the formula
6/(6+ (1—m)i), where ,thereal interest rate, is assumed =.03.Figures
in parentheses show the allowance assuming i .09.
For both corporate and individual taxpayers there may be a question
about what marginal rate to employ in setting the first—year allowance.
This difficulty also arises in the application of the adjustment of the interest
deduction discussed above to coordinate with partial C—tax treatment of real
investment. In that context, it may be acceptable to use the taxpayer's current
marginal rate. In the Auerbach—Jorgenson scheme, however, more may well be
riding on the rate chosen, because it affects the taxation of the entire asset
purchase price and not one year's yield. Thus problems caused by variations over_)49
the life cycle and variations which might be induced by the deduction itself
(shifting the taxpayer to a lower bracket) may require resort to approximations.
While the discussion thus far incorporates the basic principle of the
Auerbach—Jorgenson first year allowance, their actual proposal does not discri-
minate according to the investor's marginal tax rate. Allowances are based
instead on the present value of depreciation deductions using the same discount
rate in all cases, and thus are uniform for all taxpayers. One way to view this
is as an approximation to the theoretical model. If the allowance corresponds
to the ideal for a fifty percent marginal rate investor, for example, we see
from Table 5 the deduction will be "too large" for a lower bracket taxpayer, and
"too small" for a higher bracket taxpayer. Correspondingly there will be a
tendency for arbitrage to move the real assets toward low—bracket portfolios,
debt toward high bracket portfolios. Futhermore, if the allowances are "just
right" for the fifty percent investor, they will not be correctly calibrated
with respect to durability for the lower bracket investors, providing relatively
too much incentive to purchase short—lived assets.
The first year allowances summarized in Table 5 are predicated on the
assumption of expotential depreciation. Other depreciation patterns would,
strictly speaking, call for different allowances; otherwise some inefficiency
in the composition of investment would be expected.1 Much the same
issue has already been discussed above in connection with investment credit. In
the present state of knowledge about depreciation there is unlikely to be anything
Different depreciation patterns would also require different "recapture rules"
applicable to sale of assets, a subject we shall not pursue here.—50—
practical to be done about it.
Because under the Auerbach—Jorgenson scheme the full allowance for depre-
ciation is taken in the first year its real value is wholly insensitive to the
rate of inflation.' As we have noted, if interest payments and receipts are
adjusted for inflation, and if the correct value for the real interest rate is
employed in the formula, the Auerbach—Jorgenson first—year allowance just dupli-
cates the effect of indexing annual depreciation deductions. Otherwise, and in
particular without correction of interest payments and receipts, the effect will
not be identical. If the first year allowances are based on an assumed real
interest rate i, but nominal interest is fully taxed and deductible, the no—
arbitrage—profit equilibrium condition is given by
c =+ (l_m)i-1r(i +) . (36)
+ (i—m)i
This equilibrium condition is to be compared with (26), the condition when
depreciation is actually indexed but interest is not adjusted. Even with a
single flat rate of tax, the two are not identical unless nominal interest
adjusts according to (23). In addition, it should be stressed that under
neither approach to insulating the accounting for income from real assets from
inflation can the system reproduce the effect of adjusting interest payments
and receipts when there are different marginal tax rates. This will always
result in pressure for low bracket taxpayers to sell real assets to lend and
high bracket taxpayers to borrow to buy real assets.
1There is a frequently—overlooked but practically highly significant condition
in this statement: the investor must have sufficient taxable income gross of
the depreciation deduction to make use of it.—51—
The Auerbach—Jorgenson first year allowance is not, strictly, an S—I
incentive measure. It is a procedure for approximating the indexation of depre-
ciation allowances for inflation. It would, however, be a simple matter to com-
bine the first—year depreciation allowance with a partial first—year expensing
of investment or with an investment credit and thus realize any desired degree
of S—I incentive. A flat credit on the difference between the cost of the new
asset and the first year allowance would maintain production efficiency.1 In
the case of partial expensing the entire deduction would be available in the
first year, but it would consist of the desired fractional write—off of the
investment, with the remaining fraction eligible for the Auerbach—Jorgenson
allowance. As this approach represents simply a combination of two measures
already discussed, it recluires no fresh analysis.
IV. SUMMING UP
In this paper, I have suggested an eight way classification of saving
and investment incentives. Perhaps the most fundamental is the division into
the class of consumption tax treatments and the class of direct grants. Roughly
speaking, the former includes measures, such as accelerated depreciation and tax
sheltered retirement savings plans, which increase deductions or reduce inclu-
sions in the income tax, while the latter includes measures, primarily the
investment credit, providing an incentive not directly related to the investor's
income tax circumstances. The difference between the two classes is of impor-
tance primarily when tax rates vary in the population of savers and investors.
This is thus a "net credit,t' as discussed in footnote 1, p. 32.I would like
to thank E. Cary Prown for pointing out to me the natural adaptivity of the net
credit to the Auerbach—Jorgenson proposal.—52—
It proved possible for us to reach some fairly general conclusions
about the way incentives of the two classes operate. As to the broad charac-
teristics of the outcomes under the two approaches, we saw that increasing
levels of consumption tax incentives tend to lead to a convergence of the
returns received by savers toward the social rate of return on investment. At
the same time, because the process has the effect of displacing the income
taxation of the returns to saving, income measurement problems, including inflation
correction, tend to diminish in importance. Consumption tax incentives can also
be relatively simple to design. ,Thile this does not hold for accelerated
depreciation, we saw that expensing immediately a specified fraction of invest-
ment outlay, together with a reduced inclusion of interest receipts, provides an
incentive without distorting either investment choice (among assets of different
durabilities) or portfolio composition (between debt and real asset ownership).
The direct grant approach via the investment tax credit, by contrast,
leads to an increase, relative to the social return on investment, in the rates
of return received by savers, but does not bring about their convergence.
Provided the basis for depreciation of assets purchased is reduced by the amount
of the credit (and provided the original depreciation rates are accurate), this
approach also maintains neutrality with respect to portfolio composition. On
the other hand, designing the credit to take correct account for differences in
asset durability is relatively difficult. Furthermore, the direct grant
approach does not share with the consumption tax approach to savings and invest-
ment incentives the tendency to displace imperfect income measurement rules as
the amount of incentive is increased. In particular, it does not to the same
degree reduce the sensitivity of the tax system to the rate of inflation.-53-
A point that has been emphasized here is the interaction among the con—
swnption tax incentives. In particular, it has been stressed that applying con—
suxnption tax incentives to real investment without implementing a corresponding
exclusion of interest from tax (and corresponding reduction in interest
deductibility) tends to drive real assets into the hands of the highest bracket
taxpayers and to negate the potential of the consumption tax approach to bring
about convergence of the yields on saving. What has not, to nr knowledge, been
recognized before is that there is an exact and relatively simple degree of
interest inclusion appropriate for each level of write—off of real investment, a
fact that would ease a gradual phasing in of a consumption—type base should
this be the objective of policy.
Inflation upsets the measurement of the yield of both real and finan-
cial assets. S—I incentives are commonly viewed as instruments to offset these
measurement problems. However none of them addresses the problem of correcting
interest income. As a result it is difficult to reach clear conclusions about
their relative properties, because it is difficult to model eciuilibrium in a
graduated tax rate system. Without any correction for tax purposes, a change in
the nominal interest rate of 11(1—rn) points per point of inflation is
necessary to maintain the after—tax yield of a lender (or after tax cost of a
borrower)with marginal tax rate in.Thusan interest rate change that just off-
setsinflation for one taxpayer will be too large or too small for most others.
Just where the change settles has a bearing on the predicted effect of
measures, such as accelerated depreciation and the ITC, affecting the taxation
of real assets. Theory predicts a concentration of real investment in the hands of-5k-
relativelyhigh bracket investors and relatively large changes in interest rates
with inflation. To offset the resulting impact on the efficiency and quantity
of real investment, accelerated depreciation or the ITC offer possible alter-
natives to indexing depreciation, but they do not correct the portfolio
distortions. Furthermore, observed variation in interest rates does not seem
large enough to be consistent with this view. Fully convincing analysisof the
alternatives to indexing may have to await the sorting out of this puzzle.—55—
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